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It is likely that for at least the next twen-
ty years Saudi Arabia will retain (and in-
deed increase) its central importance as
a supplier of energy to the world econ-
omy. Hence the US and the industrial-
ized world will maintain a strong inter-
est in the country. But it will probably
be Asia that will see the biggest growth
in imports of hydrocarbons, and in-
creasingly also petrochemicals, from
the Kingdom. Even so, the balance be-
tween resources and demands within
Saudi Arabia will remain under heavy
pressure, as population growth will
outstrip the growth in revenues. In this
context, the cost of the large royal fam-
ily (some 7000 princes) is also attracting some criticism within the coun-
try; it is unclear whether Crown Prince Abdallah’s awareness of this
issue will lead it to be addressed effectively.
The most serious problem for the economy and for the longstanding
“social contract” between the regime and society, is the question of
employment. The economy is simply not generat-
ing sufficient jobs for the growing number of
young people. If this could be bridged, the coun-
try would theoretically be in a good economic po-
sition. Hence is the crucial importance of eco-
nomic reform and diversification, and of the role
of the private sector. Saudi Arabia remains in
many respects a rentier economy, and largely
also a rentier polity, with the peculiar social con-
tract that comes with this. Nevertheless, the pri-
vate sector does appear to have acquired a de-
gree of autonomy, and increasingly produces
“added value” rather than merely resting on sub-
sidised activity. This is also true for a state-owned
concern such as SABIC (Saudi Arabian Basic In-
dustries Corporation), which in fact functions
very much with a market-oriented business
ethos. The business community (of perhaps
200,000 people) has, in this context of greater au-
tonomy, also developed a greater desire for polit-
ical participation. But this does not mean a com-
mitment to whole-scale democratic reform; they
have little enthusiasm for the kind of political re-
form that would hand the levers of power to the
more radical, anti-Western Islamist strands in so-
ciety.
A different problem relates to the traditionally
large amount of military spending. Judging by
the evidence of the past two years, however,
giant weapons acquisition programmes seem to
be a thing of the past (the only such project still
running its course is the al-Yamamah project with
Britain).
Notwithstanding the reported tensions in US-
Saudi relations since 9/11, the two governments
remain mutually interested in safeguarding a
healthy world economy, a predictable supply of
energy at stable prices, and the survival of the
Saudi regime. This does not mean there may not be serious friction, or
that some in the US will not question certain aspects of the relation-
ship. While there have been several earlier periods of friction that were
overcome, this time the Cold War context within which Saudi-US rela-
tions developed ever since 1945, and from which much of the current
Kingdom’s strategic and ideological importance derived, is absent. A
real rupture, however, seems unlikely, although actors on both sides
will need to tread carefully if further complications are to be avoided. 
Political stability and
religious reform
On another note, the alliance be-
tween the Al Saud and the Wahhabi
ulama which has long been part and
parcel of the Saudi system has been
showing some evidence of strain. Yet
“Wahhabism” is itself not monolithic,
either in theory or in practice. On prin-
ciple, however, the ulama have gener-
ally upheld the need to support an ef-
fective ruler rather than risk chaos.
Hence, even where there is disagree-
ment with the Al Saud, this has not
been pushed so far as to turn main-
stream ulama into a stance of real op-
position. Yet other, newer strands have emerged, consisting of
younger, more radical ulama, and especially also non-ulama who now
claim religious expertise and who are accepted as such by parts of the
population. And this strand has indeed, with various degrees of radi-
calism, expressed some form of opposition. Yet two trends need to be
set against this. The first is that the Al Saud have been exceptionally
good at co-opting opposition voices—most recently by bringing on-
side prominent figures among the critical ulama, once the latter had
condemned the bombings in the country after 9/11. Secondly, there is
the fledgling development of a new more liberal type of Islamism, with
Saudi intellectuals beginning to think outside the “Wahhabi” context
altogether. A significant move has also been effected with the Nation-
al Dialogue, under the auspices of the Crown Prince: it is not just that
questions once deemed too sensitive to touch (such as the role of
women) are now being discussed; the very composition of the Dialogue
is telling. Indeed, the presence of a variety of groups, strikingly includ-
ing Shia religious scholars, legitimates both their role and the principle
of pluralist dialogue—thus in effect breaking the long-held Wahhabi
endorsed principle that only their school had a legitimate voice. 
Whether and how this mix of older and more fledgling trends might
lead to the sorts of reforms that would assure long-term political and
economic success remains an open question. The pressures from pop-
ulation growth, globalization, and bottom-up demands for reform are
palpable—but they are neither translated into common views by dif-
ferent parts of the Saudi public, nor, as yet, responded to effectively by
the Al Saud and its own internal constituencies.
ISIM/Workshop
From 19-21 February 2003 ISIM hosted
a workshop, Saudi Futures. Paul Aarts
(University of Amsterdam) and Gerd
Nonneman (Lancaster University, UK) brought
a group of experts from around the world,
together with a number of Saudi
commentators and observers representing
a wide spectrum of opinion. The workshop
was also sponsored by the Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Lancaster University and the
Mediterranean Programme of the European
University Institute. Topics for discussion
included trends in Saudi politics, society,
economy and international relations in
the post-9/11 and post-Iraq War era. 
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